The Ethics of Delusional Belief by Bortolotti, Lisa & Miyazono, Kengo
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The Ethics of Delusional Belief
Lisa Bortolotti1 • Kengo Miyazono2
Received: 23 November 2014 / Accepted: 18 May 2015
 The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we
apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation
of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they
are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are
overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous
adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient
experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can prevent a serious epistemic harm
from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with
their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anx-
iety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their
ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no
evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise
is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with
some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delu-
sions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to (1)
acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, (2)
establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in
epistemology, and (3) introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the
vocabulary of epistemic evaluation.
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1 Introduction
In ‘‘The Ethics of Belief’’, Clifford defends the view that there are norms governing
beliefs (doxastic norms), and argues that one such norm is that beliefs should be
formed on the basis of sufficient evidence (Clifford 2001). In recent years,
epistemologists have engaged in a lively debate on doxastic normativity and
epistemic evaluation, asking whether doxastic normativity is distinctly epistemic
and whether we should adopt a consequentialist or a deontological approach to
epistemic evaluation. In this paper, we shall not attempt to answer such questions,
but rather suggest that a closer look at the epistemic status of delusional beliefs can
shed light on several key aspects of doxastic normativity.
In this paper, we adopt a doxastic account of delusions, and presuppose that, at
least in some of the relevant circumstances, delusions are belief states. This is a
widely shared view of delusions in the psychological and psychiatric literature, and
it has been convincingly defended in the philosophical literature as well (e.g., Bayne
and Pacherie 2005; Bortolotti 2009). That said, in philosophy there is growing
scepticism about the doxastic nature of delusions (e.g., Schwitzgebel 2012; Gerrans
2014). Despite assuming doxasticism about delusions for the purposes of this paper,
we believe that our argument and our conclusions will also be of interest to anti-
doxasticists. In their accounts, most anti-doxasticists either concede that some
delusions can be beliefs, or acknowledge that the phenomenon of delusions involves
or gives rise to beliefs. For these anti-doxasticists it will be acceptable to regard
some delusions or some aspects of delusions as subject to epistemic evaluation.
Now, if delusions are beliefs at all, they are beliefs that exhibit significant
epistemic shortcomings. In the light of this, one may be tempted to dismiss
delusions as epistemically faulty and to regard agents who adopt delusions as
responsible for failing to fulfil their epistemic obligations. But, as counterintuitive as
this may sound, there are reasons to believe that agents may even benefit, both
pragmatically and epistemically, from having delusional beliefs and that they are
not epistemically blameworthy for having such beliefs.
In consequentialist approaches to epistemic evaluation, the focus is on the
consequences of an agent adopting certain beliefs or following certain rules for the
adoption of beliefs. The overarching requirement is that epistemic value should be
maximised when beliefs are adopted. Consequentialism takes different forms
depending on how epistemic value is cashed out. For instance, veritists argue that
the goal of epistemic evaluation should be the maximisation of the ratio of true to
false beliefs (e.g., Goldman 1986), whereas cognitive decision theorists typically
argue that the goal should be the maximisation of expected cognitive utility (e.g.,
Percival 2002). For virtue epistemologists, the goal is the promotion of those traits
and virtues that make one a responsible epistemic agent (e.g., Greco 2012).
In deontological approaches to epistemic evaluation, the focus is on whether
agents comply with the duties that apply to the adoption of beliefs (we call these
doxastic duties). One example of a doxastic duty is the duty to adopt a belief only
when sufficient evidence for it is available (e.g., Booth 2012). If agents do not
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comply with their doxastic duties when they can do so, then they can be blamed for
having the beliefs they have.
Let us consider two cases from the literature:
Alice the Scientist
Alice is a scientist whose research will be funded by an organisation only if
the review board of this organisation thinks that she genuinely believes in the
existence of God. Alice forms the belief that God exists, because this enables
her to pursue her research project and acquire new true beliefs that she would
not be able to acquire otherwise.1
Craig the Creationist
Craig is told by someone he considers to be both reliable and trustworthy that
there are no credible books disproving creationism. Although the question
whether creationism is true is important to him, Craig does not investigate
further, and thus does not acquire the evidence that might lead him to abandon
his belief in creationism.2
In the literature on doxastic normativity, it is common to focus on the conditions
for a belief to be justified. So, for an epistemic consequentialist committed to the
view that a belief is justified when it allows the agent to achieve a legitimate
epistemic goal, such as the maximisation of true beliefs, then Alice’s belief that God
exists would be justified if the belief did lead her to acquire more true beliefs than
false beliefs. Similarly, if an epistemic deontologist were committed to the view that
a belief is justified when the person adopting that belief fulfilled her basic doxastic
duties, then Craig’s belief in creationism would be justified if his evidence against
creationism was limited and unconvincing or discredited by sources he had reasons
to trust.
Both claims about epistemic justification seem unattractive, but there are other
lessons that can be learned by exploring the case of Alice and that of Craig that are
relevant to the ethics of adopting beliefs. We suggest that epistemic evaluation has a
broader scope than the investigation of the conditions for justified belief.
Considerations about epistemic value and about epistemic responsibility and
blameworthiness are important to agents’ practices and their mutual interactions.
Alice did not adopt the belief in the existence of God for purely epistemic reasons
(e.g., as a result of obtaining convincing evidence for it), but her belief has some
epistemic benefits nonetheless. It brings about a situation in which new true beliefs
are likely to be acquired. If Craig does not have trustworthy friends telling him
about credible books disproving creationism, he may not be in a position to realise
that alternative hypotheses to creationism are better supported by evidence.
In this paper we apply some of the considerations above to the case of delusions.
In exploring the ethics of delusion we want to consider whether adopting a
delusional belief carries any epistemic benefit (Sect. 1), and whether agents are
1 This case is adapted from Berker (2013).
2 The case is adapted from Dougherty (2011).
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responsible and should be blamed for adopting delusions (Sect. 2).3 We shall
approach the first question from the standpoint of epistemic consequentialism, and
the second question from the standpoint of epistemic deontology. We shall argue
that, at the time when the delusion is adopted, (1) the delusion may prevent serious
epistemic harm from occurring by enabling the agent to overcome overwhelming
negative emotions or anxiety, and (2) the agent is not epistemically blameworthy for
adopting the delusion if her capacity to believe otherwise is compromised. Finally,
in considering the potential implications of our view, we rely on an analogy with the
legal notion of innocence defence to describe delusions as being epistemically non-
wrongful, and agents with delusions as epistemically innocent.
2 Do Delusions have Any Positive Epistemic Consequences?
Clinical delusions are symptoms of schizophrenia, dementia, and other psychiatric
disorders. Delusions are often defined in the psychological and psychiatric literature
as beliefs characterised by their numerous epistemic shortcomings (e.g., APA 2013).
Delusions are typically implausible and resistant to evidence, they may be badly
integrated in a belief system, and they may lead to the acquisition of other false
beliefs. Agents adopt delusional hypotheses despite often realising that such
hypotheses are implausible, and maintain delusions in the face of both authoritative
challenges and counterevidence. Can beliefs with such serious epistemic short-
comings have any redeeming features?
Epistemic consequentialism seems to be the natural standpoint from which to
consider the question whether delusions have positive epistemic consequences. That
is because consequentialism is committed to the view that, in determining the
epistemic status of a belief, we have to take into account the total epistemic value of
having the belief and compare that to the total epistemic value of not having the
belief (where this may include the value of having another belief or of suspending
judgement). In this framework, even beliefs with epistemic costs can contribute to
the pursuit of epistemic goals. We shall argue that delusions are a good example of
epistemically costly beliefs that can also have epistemic benefits, because in some
contexts, when they are adopted, they prevent serious epistemic harm from
occurring. In particular, they are a means to avoiding the break-down of epistemic
functionality at a critical time, when the agent is overwhelmed by negative emotions
or hypersalient experience.
Our proposal is to take into account the context in which delusions are adopted.
In particular, we shall look at two cases: (a) the case of motivated delusions4, that is,
delusions whose formation may be affected by motivational factors, and that have
been construed as playing a defensive function (McKay and Kinsbourne 2010); and
(b) the case of elaborated and systematised delusions in schizophrenia. What
3 Here we are not concerned with the question whether delusions are justified.
4 The phrase ‘‘motivated delusions’’ can be misleading, as it may suggest that the person intentionally
adopts the delusional belief for some motive or other. In this context, as in the original context where the
phrase was used, no assumption is made about the person’s intentions.
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psychological benefits delusions have may differ depending on some of their
relevant surface features, so it is useful to group delusions according to such
features. However, we acknowledge that the proposed categories of motivated
delusions and elaborated and systematised delusions do not neatly map onto distinct
aetiologies and are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Some delusions are neither
elaborated nor motivated (i.e., so-called ‘‘deficit’’ delusions such as the Capgras
delusion), and delusions in schizophrenia can be elaborated, systematised and, to
some extent, motivated (e.g., persecutory and grandiose delusions).
2.1 The Case of Motivated Delusions
Example of delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function are
the Reverse Othello syndrome and anosognosia. Such delusions have been found to
have epistemic benefits that are mediated by their positive effects on wellbeing
(Bortolotti 2014).
In a case of Reverse Othello syndrome (Butler 2000), a musician (BX) became
quadriplegic as a result of a car accident and developed the delusion that he was still
in a happy relationship with his previous romantic partner. The delusion seemed to
protect BX from the undesirable truth that his romantic partner had left him while he
was coping with the consequences of permanent disability. No other delusions or
psychotic symptoms were observed (Butler 2000, p. 90). Butler argues that the
delusion was a psychological defence against depression and this contributed to the
fixity and elaboration of BX’s delusional system. The delusion kept BX’s
depression at bay at a time that was critical. Acknowledging the end of his
romantic relationship might have been disastrous when he was coping with the
realisation of his new disability and its effects on his life.
In anosognosia the agent refuses to acknowledge a serious impairment as a result
of trauma or illness, and often also fails to recognise its implications. Ramachandran
(1996) advances the hypothesis that the behaviours that give rise to delusions in this
context are an exaggeration of normal defence mechanisms that have an adaptive
function. Denying change can sometimes be instrumental to preserving a coherent
system of beliefs and behaving in a stable and predictable manner (Ramachandran
1996). The psychological advantages are not necessarily cashed out in terms of the
preservation of the concept of the self as healthy, but in terms of the preservation of
the concept of the present self as coherent with that of the past self. Fotopoulou has
observed this phenomenon in people who do not update personal information
because they ‘‘need to highlight their continuity and coherence with their past selves
and may not be able to understand or deal with the loss of their previous family and
social role.’’ (Fotopoulou 2008, p. 560).
Aimola Davies et al. (2009) report that there are both positive and negative
effects of anosognosia on wellbeing, and suggest that there could be a role for
motivational factors in the explanation of anosognosia. Anosognosia has negative
effects in that people who do not acknowledge their illness or impairment may be
slow in seeking treatment and less motivated to engage in rehabilitation. But
anosognosia is associated with reduced anxiety. Its effects include: ‘‘protection from
negative emotional states, reduced medical complications, and lower levels of
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anxiety and depression’’ (Aimola Davies et al. 2009, p. 200). Indeed, self-report of
symptoms post-injury correlates with higher emotional distress (Gasquoine 2015).
According to the ‘‘shear-pin’’ account discussed by McKay and Dennett (2009),
some false beliefs count as psychologically adaptive if they help manage negative
emotions and avoid low self-esteem and depression. McKay and Dennett suggest
that, in situations of extreme stress, motivational influences are allowed to intervene
in the process of belief evaluation, causing a breakage. The breakage seems to be
bad news from an epistemic point of view, as the result is that agents come to
believe what they desire to be true and not what they have evidence for. However,
the breakage is not an evolutionary ‘‘mistake’’, it is designed to avoid breakages that
would have worse consequences for the agent’s self-esteem and wellbeing.
Could motivated delusions be adaptive misbeliefs? The hypothesis is that the
mechanism that inhibits motivational influences on belief evaluation becomes
compromised, and thus motivated delusions emerge, making negative emotions
easier to manage and depression less likely to ensue. In their paper McKay and
Dennett consider the possibility that some delusions count as adaptive misbeliefs.
They argue that, although there is an adaptive mechanism allowing desires to
influence belief formation in situations of extreme stress, the extent to which desires
influence belief formation in the case of delusions is pathological. Motivated
delusions are the result of the maladaptive version of a psychologically adaptive
mechanism.
As described by McKay and Dennett, the situation in which adaptive misbeliefs
emerge is already seriously compromised. The premise is that the agent is
experiencing high levels of distress, and can come to serious harm unless her
negative emotions are managed. Our reading of the situation is that the adaptive
misbelief is equivalent to an emergency response. Indeed, McKay and Dennett talk
about the ‘‘extraordinary circumstances’’ in which motivational influences on belief
are not just tolerated but desirable. By believing in a more positive version of reality
(e.g., ‘‘I am now severely disabled, but my girlfriend is still by my side’’; ‘‘I’m still
as self-sufficient as I was before the accident’’) than the one they have evidence for,
agents manage negative feelings that could become overwhelming, avoid depres-
sion, preserve self-esteem, and overcome anxiety and stress.
McKay and Dennett focus on the effects of adaptive misbeliefs on wellbeing and
their argument is for the psychological adaptiveness of delusions in some contexts.
The point of allowing motivational factors to influence belief evaluation is to make
the agent feel better about herself and her situation. But our suggestion is that the
adoption of the delusion can have some epistemic benefits that are mediated by the
psychological ones. In the given circumstances, the delusional belief is likely to
have positive effects on the agent’s capacity to function epistemically (what we call
‘‘epistemic functionality’’).
The following is an empirically plausible account of the form that the epistemic
benefits can take. Although negative emotions, stress, and anxiety are a natural and
often an adaptive response to traumatic and threatening situations, when they
become overwhelming they are correlated with difficulties in directed thinking and
recall, irritability, and emotional disturbances. More important to us, they have been
robustly linked to poor short-term memory, impaired concentration, and reduced
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attention (see Eysenck 1992 for a classic overview, and Forster et al. 2015 for a
recent study of how anxiety affects sustained attention tasks). This finding applies
cross-diagnostically and there are several theories attempting to shed light on the
underlying mechanisms responsible for it.
The difficulties in cognitive processing have a negative impact on both agents’
capacity to acquire new information and their socialisation, making interaction with
other people less frequent and less conducive to the exchange of relevant
information and to feedback on existing beliefs. Thus, due to reduced socialisation
and limited engagement with the environment, the capacity to update existing
beliefs and acquire new ones (which is key to epistemic functionality) is
compromised. By relieving the stress caused by trauma or other adversities, the
adoption of a motivated delusion allows the agent to engage with her surrounding
physical and social environment in a way that is more likely to lead to epistemic
achievements than the paralysing state of depression that is likely to take over
otherwise.
As we mentioned earlier, our interest here is not in whether delusions are
justified. We acknowledge that their potential epistemic benefits are accompanied
by significant epistemic shortcomings. Because of that, the claims that the adoption
of a delusion leads to the acquisition of more true beliefs than false beliefs and that
delusions are epistemically beneficial overall do not seem promising. Rather, we
suggest that in some circumstances the adoption of a delusion enables the agent to
continue acquiring beliefs, whether true or false, and engage in other relevant
practices such as giving and receiving feedback, and exchanging information. Such
practices would be seriously disrupted by the epistemic break-down that
overwhelmingly negative emotions, anxiety, and stress can engender after trauma.
In the case of motivated delusions, the epistemic benefits we have described are
mediated by the psychological adaptiveness of the delusions.
2.2 The Case of Elaborated and Systematised Delusions in Schizophrenia
According to one popular account of the formation of schizophrenic delusions, in
the prodromal phase of psychosis, people are bombarded with stimuli presented to
them as inexplicably salient (Jaspers 1963; Kapur 2003).
This general delusional atmosphere with all its vagueness of content must be
unbearable. Patients obviously suffer terribly under it and to reach some
definite idea at last is like being relieved of some enormous burden. […] The
achievement brings strength and comfort. […] No dread is worse than that of
danger unknown (Jaspers 1963, p. 98).
People do not know how to interpret the hypersalient stimuli and become
anxious. The world becomes difficult to understand and predict. Anomalous
experiences create puzzlement, and anxiety. The agent is constantly expecting
something important to happen, until the delusional hypothesis is endorsed. With
the adoption of the delusion, uncertainty is overcome and puzzling experiences are
made sense of. In this context, the adoption of delusions that can become elaborated
and systematised is described as both psychologically and biologically adaptive
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(Roberts 1992; Mishara and Corlett 2009) and is found to have some epistemic
benefits too (Bortolotti, forthcoming).
Glenn Roberts argues that delusion formation is adaptive in that it allows agents
to attribute meaning to their experience and overcome anxiety. He finds that patients
with systematised delusions score higher than patients in remission, rehabilitation
nurses, and Anglican ordinands in the purpose in life test and the life regard index
(Roberts 1991). From these striking results, Roberts concludes that ‘‘elaborate
delusional systems may, in part, be perpetuated and mediated by the associated
psychological benefits’’ (Roberts 1992, p. 305).
Roberts’ findings seem consistent with more recent studies, according to which
delusions confer meaning to otherwise deeply puzzling and inexplicable experi-
ences and help enhance what has been called an overall ‘‘sense of coherence’’. The
sense of coherence is defined as ‘‘a global orientation that expresses the extent to
which one has a pervasive, enduring though dynamic, feeling of confidence that (1)
the stimuli deriving from one’s internal and external environments are structured,
predictable, and explicable; (2) the resources are available to one to meet the
demands posed by these stimuli; and (3) these demands are challenges, worthy of
investment and engagement’’ (Antonovsky 1987, p. 91).
Bergstein and colleagues (2008) find that the sense of coherence is not reduced in
people ‘‘in an acute delusional state’’. The sense that their lives are meaningful
might even be enhanced with respect to the non-clinical population, especially when
the delusional system is elaborated. Sense of coherence and meaningfulness are
found to correlate with wellbeing. In the transition from the acute state to remission,
when conviction in the delusions fades and the new explanation for the delusional
experiences involves insight into psychosis, sense of coherence and meaningfulness
are reduced, and levels of wellbeing are also found to drop.
Do meaningfulness and sense of coherence translate into epistemic benefits? A
first hypothesis about the epistemic benefits of elaborated and systematised
delusions emerges from the claim that their formation provides relief from stress
and anxiety, as in the case of motivated delusions. Here the initial anxiety would not
be caused by the effects of trauma or other adversities, but by the puzzling nature of
hypersalient experience.
First, endogenous psychosis evolves slowly (not overnight). For many patients
it evolves through a series of stages: a stage of heightened awareness and
emotionality combined with a sense of anxiety and impasse, a drive to ‘‘make
sense’’ of the situation, and then usually relief and a ‘‘new awareness’’ as the
delusion crystallizes and hallucinations emerge (Kapur 2003, p. 15).
The suggestion seems to be that, unless the inexplicability of salient events which
is characteristic of delusional mood is resolved, great anxiety and negative emotions
can become overwhelming, with adverse effects for wellbeing (Bergstein et al.
2008; Roberts 1992). As we saw, mounting anxiety and an inability to manage
negative emotions can also have negative effects for epistemic functionality. In
particular, lack of concentration and attention are the most frequently reported
symptoms in the prodromal phase of psychosis (e.g., Yung and McGorry 1996).
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A second hypothesis about the epistemic benefits of systematised delusions is
that their formation engenders an attitude towards experience which promotes an
active engagement with the environment and, arguably, the acquisition of new
information. The agent who has formed a delusional hypothesis no longer finds her
experience puzzling, but feels that it is in her power to understand it and that it is
important to come to such an understanding. The sense of coherence measured by
Bergstein and colleagues seems to include intellectual curiosity and a general sense
of self-efficacy and purpose that would not be present in the state of passive,
anxious uncertainty that characterises the agent’s experience prior to the formation
of the delusion. An enhanced sense of coherence allows people to view their own
experiences as interesting and worth investigating.
A third hypothesis about the epistemic benefits of systematised delusions is that
delusions enable the agent ‘‘to remain in vital connection with his/her environment’’
(Mishara and Corlett 2009, p. 531). This is due to the effects of delusion formation
on learning. Mishara and Corlett describe the process by which delusions are formed
and consolidated. According to them, there is often a long period of great anxiety
during which the agent is constantly expecting something important to happen.
During this period, the automated and habitual processes by which we learn are
disrupted due to an incorrect signalling of prediction errors, and conscious and
controlled processes take over.
Attention is drawn toward irrelevant stimuli, thoughts, and associative
connections which are distressing and unpredictable (Kapur 2003; McGhie
and Chapman 1961; Uhlhaas and Mishara 2007). This reflects an impairment
in the brain’s predictive learning mechanisms, such that unexpected events,
prediction errors, are registered inappropriately (Corlett et al. 2007). (Mishara
and Corlett 2009, p. 531)
Following Conrad (1958), who described the formation of delusions as a
revelation, Mishara and Corlett argue that when the delusion is formed it puts an end
to the overwhelming anxiety. The sense of unpredictability caused by the inaccurate
coding of a prediction error stops. Attention is drawn away from the stimuli
previously experienced as inexplicable and distressing, because a suitable expla-
nation has been found for the unpredictable associations. Automated and habitual
processes underlying learning resume their normal function. The delusion is
stamped into memory, advocated, and reinforced every time a new prediction error
is registered. The shift back to the habitual and the automated processing of learning
can enhance the capacity to respond to cues in the environment. The delusion plays
a dominant role in providing explanations for the phenomena previously found to be
puzzling and anomalous: ‘‘the delusions […] involve a ‘reorganization’ of the
patient’s experience to maintain behavioral interaction with the environment despite
the underlying disruption to perceptual binding processes’’ (Mishara and Corlett
2009, p. 531).
Mishara and Corlett (2009) are interested in the way delusion formation in the
context of schizophrenia can preserve and even enhance learning and memory. They
argue that the attention and control dedicated to the unpredictable hypersalient
events detract from the agent’s capacity to learn and remember. Prior to the
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formation of the delusion, the uncertainty caused by the unexpected associations
causes conscious and controlled processes responsible for learning to focus on the
stimuli that seem perplexing or threatening at the expense of the other stimuli that
end up being neglected. When the delusion is formed, attention is released and
habitual and automated processing resume: ‘‘the delusion disables flexible,
controlled conscious processing from continuing to monitor the mounting distress
of the wanton prediction error during delusional mood and thus deters cascading
toxicity’’ (Mishara and Corlett 2009, p. 531). The adoption of the delusional belief
‘‘frees up’’ the agent’s cognitive resources.
2.3 Qualifications and Interim Conclusions
So far we have reviewed some arguments for the view that adopting delusional
beliefs can have some epistemic benefits. The claim needs to be qualified, though.
Relief from stress and anxiety may be observed at the stage of adoption of the
delusion, both in the context of motivated delusions and delusions within
schizophrenia, but in the latter case the maintenance of the delusion often increases
rather than reduces anxiety. Agents may no longer feel anxious and distressed about
the consequences of their puzzling experience of hypersalience (‘‘How should I
interpret this?’’), but new anxieties arise due to the often disturbing content of the
delusion and the social isolation that ensues from reporting the delusion and being
met with incredulity (Broome et al. 2005). Grandiose delusions are correlated with
high self-esteem and low depression, but other delusions with negative content, such
as delusions of persecution, are correlated with high depression and low self-esteem
(e.g., Smith et al. 2006).
We saw that the formation of delusions is correlated with an increased sense of
coherence and allows the agent to resume contact with her environment. We
highlighted the potential benefits this may have for the agent’s attitude and the
potential for acquiring new beliefs, but we should also consider that the agent with
delusions will not approach the world with an open mind. New experiences will be
interpreted as confirming the hypotheses that have crystallised into delusions. Every
time a new salient fact is confronted, ‘‘there is a ‘monotonous’ spreading of the
delusion to new experience’’ (Mishara and Corlett 2009, p. 531). Thus, it seems very
plausible that agents with delusions are more likely to acquire new beliefs than
agents puzzled by hypersalience, but some of these new beliefs are likely to be
consistent with the delusional hypothesis.
Finally, one may wonder whether the features we mentioned are unique to
delusions. Wouldn’t an anxiety-relief pill, a good night sleep, or a lovely meal have
the same beneficial effects on epistemic functionality as the formation of the
delusion (and fewer costs)? This is a good point but, from a merely consequentialist
standpoint, one can just bite the bullet. If the anxiety-relief pill has the same effects
as the adoption of the delusion and fewer costs, then it has a higher epistemic value.
It is still significant that delusions can prevent serious epistemic harm from
occurring. By paying attention to these unexpected features of delusions we
contribute to providing a more balanced epistemic evaluation of epistemically
costly beliefs, and we may even contribute to an explanation of delusion formation.
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There is something more we can say, something that will appeal to non-
consequentialists as well, about the specific contribution that delusions can make to
restoring epistemic functionality. When the delusion defuses negative emotions and
increases the sense of meaningfulness of one’s life, it does so via its content. In the
case of Reverse Othello syndrome, it is because BX believes that his former partner
is still faithful to him that he overcomes the negative feelings about his prospects
after the car accident that caused him severe disability. In delusions of reference, it
is because the agent with schizophrenia interprets hypersalient events as related to
her role in some important enterprise that she can find the world around her
interesting and engaging again. At least in the contexts we have discussed, the
delusion acts as a belief that transforms the scenario in which the agent finds herself,
and supports epistemic functionality because of that.
Our interim conclusion is that, in the conditions of anxiety and stress generated
by the adverse effects of trauma and adversities or the salience of unpredictable
stimuli, the formation of a delusion can help manage negative emotions and
overcome the delusional mood characterised by hypersalience. The psychological
benefits of delusions are correlated with short-term epistemic benefits that depend
on the agent having her epistemic functionality compromised prior to the delusional
belief being adopted. The adoption of a delusion prevents the occurrence of a
disastrous epistemic break-down, but its benefits are unlikely to outlive the
resolution of the break-down.
Given that the adoption of a delusion has significant epistemic shortcomings, it
would be preferable to adopt a belief that supports the agent’s epistemic
functionality to the same extent as the delusion, but does not have the same
epistemic shortcomings. Is there an alternative to adopting a delusional belief? A
thought worth exploring is that, in the extraordinary circumstances in which agents
find themselves prior to developing a delusion, no other belief is available.
In Sect. 2, we shall ask whether agents who endorse delusional beliefs can
believe otherwise and whether they should be considered responsible and
doxastically blameworthy for their delusional beliefs.
3 Delusional Beliefs and Doxastic Blame
It is a common idea, inside and outside philosophy, that agents with serious mental
disorders impairing agency might not be fully blameworthy for their ethically
problematic actions when these are caused by their mental disorders. In a case
where, for example, George with schizophrenia attacks his neighbours because of
his delusion that the neighbours are trying to kill him, he might not be fully
blameworthy for the attacking.5 This, of course, does not mean that the action is
acceptable. Attacking neighbours is obviously ethically problematic. The idea is
rather that George, the agent, is not fully blameworthy for his ethically problematic
action.
5 It is not our claim, however, that agents with schizophrenia are always blameless. See Broome et al.
(2010) for a more detailed discussion.
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In this section, we defend a similar claim with respect to whether agents are
blameworthy for believing delusional hypotheses.6 The claim is that agents with
delusions are, at least in many cases, not blameworthy for their delusional beliefs.
George, for instance, is not blameworthy for the delusional belief that his
neighbours are trying to kill him. This, of course, does not mean that the delusion is
not epistemically faulty. In the previous section, we argued that delusions have
some epistemic benefits. At the same time, though, we acknowledged that delusions
have several epistemic shortcomings; most of them are false and, even when they
are not, they are accidentally true at best and, thus, they do not amount to
knowledge.7 Moreover, we noticed that delusions often do not cohere well with the
agents’ other beliefs and are resistant to counterevidence. Thus, we do not wish to
argue that delusions are epistemically unproblematic. Rather, we argue that agents
are, at least in many cases, not blameworthy for their delusions.
In general terms, when are agents blameworthy for epistemically faulty beliefs,
whether these are delusional or not? There are two extreme answers to this question.
The first answer is that agents are always blameworthy for their epistemically faulty
beliefs. Let us call this first view ‘‘universalism’’. The second answer is that agents
are never blameworthy for their epistemically faulty beliefs. Let us call this second
view ‘‘nihilism’’. And there is a third, modest answer according to which agents are
sometimes, but not always, blameworthy for their epistemically faulty beliefs. We
call this third view ‘‘restrictivism’’. In the following discussion, we presuppose that
restrictivism is true. The main challenge to restrictivism comes from the famous
argument in Alston (1989): (1) doxastic blameworthiness implies voluntary control
over beliefs; (2) agents do not have voluntary control over any of their beliefs; (3)
therefore, they are never blameworthy for any of their beliefs.8 There are many
critical responses to the argument in the literature,9 but there is no agreement about
what exactly is wrong in the argument.
We assume restrictivism because we find it independently plausible. In addition,
restrictivism makes our claim interesting. On the one hand, our claim that agents
with delusions are, at least in many cases, not blameworthy for their delusional
beliefs is true, but only trivially, if nihilism is true. If agents are never blameworthy
for their epistemically faulty beliefs, then it is trivially true that agents are not
blameworthy for their delusional beliefs. On the other hand, our claim is guaranteed
to be false if universalism is true. If agents are always blameworthy for their
epistemically faulty beliefs, then it is guaranteed to be false that agents are not
blameworthy for their delusional beliefs. Thus, there is no room for a serious
discussion about our claim within nihilism or universalism. According to
6 In the following, the term ‘‘blameworthiness’’ primarily refers to epistemic blameworthiness or, more
precisely, blameworthiness for beliefs with epistemic shortcomings.
7 Jaspers, for example, argues that a delusion of jealousy ‘‘does not cease to be a delusion although the
spouse of the patient is in fact unfaithful - sometimes only as a result of the delusion’’ (Jaspers 1963,
p. 106).
8 Although this argument could be used to motivate nihilism, Alston is not a nihilist. He grants that
agents could be blameworthy for believing in some cases but insists that such a notion of blame does not
provide an account of justification in epistemology.
9 See Peels (2013a, b)) for an overview.
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restrictivism, however, there is room for a serious discussion about it. In some cases,
agents are blameworthy for their epistemically faulty beliefs. In other cases, they are
not. Then, there is room for investigating whether the case of an agent with
delusional beliefs falls in the first or the second category.
3.1 On the Ability to Believe Otherwise
The crucial notion in our argument is that of the ability to believe otherwise, which
we define in the following way:
S, with an epistemically faulty belief that p, was able to believe otherwise iff
there is an evidential action A, which was available to S, such that if S had
performed (not performed) A, S would have believed otherwise.
An action is an ‘‘evidential action’’ in case it is directly related to searching,
gathering, or processing evidence.10 Evidential actions include: reading newspapers,
paying attention to some objects, careful reasoning, and so on. An evidential action
A is ‘‘available’’ to S in case S would have successfully performed A if S had tried
to do so. Reading the newspaper in front of me is available to me because I would
have successfully read the newspaper if I had tried to do so. S, with the belief that p,
‘‘believes otherwise’’ in case S fails to believe that p. To see how this notion
actually works, think about the following two cases.
Defence Minister
A minister of defense has some reason to think that large-scale fraud has been
perpetrated in the army. A committee is formed which studies the presumed
fraud in detail and writes a long report about the situation, which they hand
over to him. The minister, however, spends most of his time relaxing on the
beach behind his house, enjoying the sun and eating pizzas. Consequently, he
does not read a single letter of the report. As a result of that, he is ignorant of
the fraud. For instance, he holds certain false beliefs about the army, beliefs
for which he might nonetheless have good evidence, as long as he does not
read the dossier.11
Orange Juice
Mark is writing out the shopping list for the weekly grocery shop. He goes to
the fridge and sees that there is a carton of orange juice in the fridge. He forms
the belief that there is orange juice in the fridge, and hence that he does not
need to buy orange juice. As it turns out both of these beliefs are false. One of
his housemates finishes off the orange juice, but stupidly put the empty carton
back in the fridge. When Mark finds this out, he is irritated at his housemate,
but he is also irritated at himself. He did not have to draw the conclusion that
there was orange juice in the fridge. He was, after all, living in a student house
where people do all sorts of dumb things. That his housemate might have
10 The actions that are only indirectly related to evidence are not evidential actions. Reading an email is
an evidential action, but arranging one’s inbox is not.
11 This case is discussed by Nottelman and Peels (2013a, b).
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returned an empty container to the fridge was well within the range of live
possibilities.12
The defence minister was able to believe otherwise. Reading the report is an
evidential action that was perfectly available to him. And, if he had read the report,
he would have believed otherwise. Again, Mark was able to believe otherwise.
Checking the container is an evidential action that was perfectly available to him.
And, if he had checked the container, he would have believed otherwise.
It is tempting to think that there is an intimate connection between doxastic
blameworthiness and the ability to believe otherwise. In particular, one might think
that doxastic blameworthiness implies the ability to believe otherwise.
Principle of Alternative Believability (PAB)
If S is blameworthy for her belief that p, S was able to believe otherwise.13
Let us, first, look at the examples above. The defence minister seems to be clearly
blameworthy for his false beliefs about the army. And, as we just noted, he was able
to believe otherwise. Again, Mark seems to be blameworthy for his false belief
about the orange juice, given the fact that, in his household, it was a live possibility
(and he knew it) that an empty container is stupidly put back in the fridge. And, as
we just noted, he was able to believe otherwise.
Now let us think about a slightly different version of Defence Minister, ‘‘Defence
Minister 2’’, where the defence minister tried to read the report, which is a PDF file,
but failed because it was protected with a password that the minister did not know
due to some administrative errors by his secretary. The minister consequently
retained false beliefs about the army. Assuming that the minister had no alternative
source of information about the fraud in the army, he was not able to believe
otherwise. Thus, the minister does not seem to be blameworthy for his false beliefs
in this case.
Let us consider, again, a slightly different version of Orange Juice, ‘‘Orange
Juice 2’’, where one of Mark’s housemates, who is a magician, finished off the
orange juice in the container and put water into the container instead. Next, the
water was transformed into something that was totally indistinguishable from
orange juice by his magic. Mark checked the container and, being fooled by the
magic, retained his belief that there was orange juice in the fridge. Assuming that
the Mark had no alternative source of information about the orange juice, Mark was
not able to believe otherwise. Mark does not seem to be blameworthy for his false
belief in this case.
These cases are therefore consistent with PAB. However, PAB is controversial. A
problem comes from notorious Frankfurt-style cases.14 Let us consider, for example,
another version of Defence Minister, ‘‘Defence Minister 3’’, where, just like in the
original Defence Minister, the minister did not even try to read the report and,
consequently, he retained his false beliefs about the army. Unbeknown to the
12 This case is discussed by Weatherson (2008).
13 See, e.g., Hetherington (2002) and Leon (2002).
14 See Nottelmann (2007) and Nottelmann and Peels (2013) for a discussion of Frankfurt-style cases in
the context of doxastic responsibility.
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minister, just like in Defence Minister 2, the report was protected with a password
that the minister did not know and, accordingly, even if he had tried to read it, he
would have still believed the same false propositions about the army. In this case,
the minister seems to be blameworthy for his false beliefs. After all, he thinks and
behaves in Defence Minister 3 (i.e. spending most of his time relaxing on the beach
without trying to read the report at all) in exactly the same way as in Defence
Minister where he is clearly blameworthy. There does not seem to be any relevant
difference between two cases that makes the minister blameworthy in one case but
not in the other. However, assuming that the minister had no alternative source of
information, he was not able to believe otherwise because of the password
protection. Thus, Defence Minister 3 looks like a counterexample to PAB.
Another possible counterexample is the case where the minister was not able to
believe otherwise but the minister himself was responsible for the inability to
believe otherwise. Let us consider, for example, ‘‘Defence Minister 4’’ in which, just
like in Defence Minister 2, the minister tried to read the report, but fails because it is
protected with a password that the minister does not know. As a result, he retained
his false beliefs about the army. In this case, however, the password had already
been given to the minister. He had just lost it because of his laziness. The password
was confidential and it could not be retrieved or reissued. In this case, it looks as
though the minister is blameworthy for his false beliefs about the army even though
he was not able to believe otherwise. Thus, Defence Minister 4 looks like another
counterexample to PAB.15
One might think, however, that Defence Minister 4 is not a counterexample to
PAB because the minister was able to believe otherwise in this case. For instance, if
the minister had kept the password, he would have believed otherwise. This
objection fails, however, because keeping a password is not an evidential action in
our sense. As we already noted, evidential actions are the ones that are directly
related to searching, gathering, or processing evidence. Reading an email is an
evidential action. Arranging one’s inbox is not. Keeping a password is, just like
arranging one’s inbox, related to evidence only indirectly.
To deal with these cases, we retreat to the following claim:
PAB2
If S is blameworthy for her belief that p, then either (a) it is not the case that S
believes that p (partly) because S was not able to believe otherwise, or (b) S is
responsible for the fact that S was not able to believe otherwise.
(The right hand side of PAB2 is trivially true in the case where S is able to
believe otherwise, since (a) is trivially true in such a case, and it makes the
disjunction (a) or (b) trivially true as well.)
Defence Minister 3 is not a counterexample to PAB2 because its right hand side
is true in the case. Certainly, the minister was not able to believe otherwise.
However, this is due to the fact that the report was locked with a password that the
minister did not know, which had nothing to do with minister’s believing the false
propositions. Thus, it is not the case that the minister believes the false propositions
15 We thank Jordi Ferna´ndez for raising this issue.
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because he was not able to believe otherwise, which means that the clause (a) is
satisfied in this case.
Defence Minister 4 is not a counterexample either because, again, the right hand
side is true. The minister was not able to believe otherwise and, in addition, he
believed the false propositions partly because he was not able to believe otherwise
due to password protection (thus, the clause (a) is not satisfied). However, he is
responsible for the fact that he was not able to believe otherwise, which means that
the clause (b) is satisfied in this case. He is the person who is responsible for the loss
of the password, and losing the password is what makes it the case that he is not able
to believe otherwise.
3.2 On Blameworthiness
Here is our argument for the claim that agents are, at least in many cases, not
blameworthy for their delusional beliefs. Assuming that an agent Sd has a delusional
belief that p:
1. Sd believes that p partly because Sd was not able to believe otherwise.
2. Sd is not responsible for the fact that Sd was not able to believe otherwise.
3. If Sd is blameworthy for her belief that p, then either (a) it is not the case that Sd
believes that p (partly) because Sd was not able to believe otherwise, or (b) Sd is
responsible for the fact that Sd was not able to believe otherwise.
4. Therefore, Sd is not blameworthy for believing p.
We maintain that this argument is applicable to at least many agents with
delusions. The third premise directly comes from PAB2, which we take to be
reasonable enough. At the very least, it is not refuted by Frankfurt-style cases. In the
following discussion, we aim to support the first and the second premises.
To support these premises, first, we claim that many agents with delusions are not
able to believe otherwise or, at the very least, that their ability to believe otherwise
is significantly compromised due to some impairments and biases. Second, we argue
that the inability to believe otherwise is explanatory of their believing delusional
hypotheses (and, thus, the first premise is true), and also that they are not
responsible for the fact that they are not able to believe otherwise (and, thus, the
second premise is true).16
The first factor that compromises the ability to believe otherwise is the inability
to regard relevant alternative hypotheses as live possibilities. If one believes a
certain hypothesis, but fails to regard alternative hypotheses as live possibilities,
then evidential actions are not likely to lead to believing otherwise. Suppose that the
16 One might think, however, that the second premise is false in the case of delusions due to drug abuse.
In such cases, agents are actually responsible for the inability to believe otherwise. We do not deny this
claim. But it is possible that, in some cases of delusions due to drug abuse, agents are not responsible for
the inability to believe otherwise because they are not responsible for the addictive drug consumption.
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defence minister failed to find it a live possibility that large-scale fraud had been
perpetrated in the army. In this case, he would not have believed otherwise even if
he had read the report. He might have concluded that the report was unreliable. In
the study by Freeman et al. (2004), research participants with delusions were asked
to come up with alternative, non-delusional explanations of the events on the basis
of which their delusions were formed and maintained. Surprisingly, three quarters of
the participants failed to report any alternative hypotheses.17
Three quarters of the patients reported that there was no alternative
explanation for their experiences. The delusion was their only explanation.
This matches with clinical experience. Nevertheless, it is a striking finding. By
definition a delusional belief is highly improbable. The evidence cited for a
delusion is, at best, ambiguous. Yet most individuals could not report any
potential alternative explanation for the ambiguous evidence however unlikely
that they considered the alternative. (Freeman et al. 2004, p. 677)
The second factor is the inability to examine competing hypotheses carefully. If
one believes a certain hypothesis, but is not able to examine competing hypotheses
very carefully, then it is not likely that evidential actions will lead to believing
otherwise. Suppose that the defence minister is not capable of examining the fraud
hypothesis carefully. In this case, he might have failed to believe otherwise even if
he had read the report. Huq et al. (1988) revealed that agents with delusions have the
bias of coming to conclusions with less evidence in comparison to controls (the
jumping-to-conclusion bias). In their experiment, research participants (delusional
group, non-delusional clinical group, and non-clinical group) were requested to
identify if a given jar was jar A, which contained 85 pink and 15 green beads, or jar
B, which contained 15 pink and 85 green beads, on the basis of the observation of
the beads drawn from the jar. They found that participants in the delusional group
came to a conclusion with less information (2.22 beads drawn from the jar on
average) than participants in different groups (3.6 and 4.58 beads for non-clinical
group and non-delusional clinical group respectively).
Relatedly, agents with delusions have strong desire to reach conclusions. In a
study by Colbert and Peters (2002), research participants (non-clinical individuals)
were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with statements concerning
need for closure, which is ‘‘the desire for a definite answer on some topic, any
answer compared to confusion and ambiguity’’ (Kruglanski 1989, p. 14). They
found that the tendency to delusional ideation is statistically correlated with a high
17 Strictly speaking, the evidence provided by this study is not sufficient to show that agents cannot
believe otherwise at the time of adopting the delusion. It shows that, once agents have formed a delusional
belief, they fail to regard alternative hypotheses as live possibilities. It is unlikely that available evidential
actions after the formation of delusions would cause them to believe otherwise. But, the study does not
show that agents fail to regard alternative hypotheses as live possibilities at the time of adopting a
delusional belief. Available evidential actions prior to the formation of delusions could cause agents to
believe otherwise. Our speculation is that, even prior to the formation of delusions, an agent typically
regards the delusional hypothesis as the only plausible explanation of their experience. A first personal
account of delusion formation process by Chadwick (2001) seems to support our speculation. However,
more evidence is needed before a firm conclusion can be drawn. Methodologically, it is difficult to gather
evidence relevant to the stage of adoption of the delusional hypothesis.
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need for closure (although need for closure was not correlated with the tendency to
jump to conclusions). Need for closure was also found to be strong in clinical
individuals with current or remitted persecutory delusions (Bentall and Swarbrick
2003).
The third factor comes from the motivational states (such as desires and
emotions) that drive delusional hypotheses. If an agent’s belief is influenced by
strong motivational states, then her evidential actions are not likely to lead to
believing otherwise. Let us consider the scenario in Defence Minister again and
suppose that the minister’s false beliefs about the army were motivated by his strong
desire for the soundness of the army. In that case, he would not have believed
otherwise even if he had read the report.18 The idea that some delusions are driven
by motivational states has received some attention in the recent literature. As we
observed in Sect. 1, so-called motivated delusions, such as Reverse Othello
syndrome, erotomania and anosognosia, are likely to be driven by motivational
forces.
Further, it has been suggested that persecutory delusions are the products of an
externalising attribution bias, namely, the bias an agent is subject to if she attributes
negative events to other agents rather than to herself. In a study by Kaney and
Bentall (1989), research participants (delusional group, depressed group, and non-
clinical group) were requested to answer questions about the causes of positive and
negative events. They found that participants in the depressed group tended to
attribute negative events to themselves, while participants in the delusional group
attributed negative events to external causes and positive events to themselves. This
externalising bias could be easily construed as a defence mechanism. For instance,
one could argue that the bias is a means to protecting self-esteem.
[…] in normal individuals, the tendency to attribute the cause of negative
events to external factors maintains self-esteem through the abrogation of
responsibility. Since this tendency is significantly more marked in people with
persecutory delusions, such delusions can be seen as an extreme method of
maintaining self-esteem, a hypothesis which is consistent with Zigler and
Glick’s suggestion that paranoia is a form of camouflaged depression. (Bentall
et al. 1994, p. 334)
The existence of these three factors strongly suggests that many agents with
delusions are not able to believe otherwise or, at the very least, that their ability to
believe otherwise is significantly compromised.19
18 One might think, however, that the minister is blameworthy in this case. Our response depends on the
details of the case. For instance, the minister is not blameworthy if it turns out that the belief is so strongly
fixed by the minister’s desire that it is not responsive to obvious counterevidence. In such a case, the
minister’s belief might be regarded as akin to a motivated delusion. Of course, it is not our view that
agents are never blameworthy for false or irrational beliefs that are due to motivational factors. Our view
is rather that agents are not blameworthy for false or irrational beliefs that are due to motivational factors
in case the influence of the motivational factors is so strong that agents are unable to believe otherwise
(according to our definition).
19 An objection is that these factors can also be found in non-delusional irrational beliefs such as racist
beliefs. Does that mean, then, that people are not blameworthy for their racist beliefs? It is not obvious,
however, that people with racist beliefs are not able to believe otherwise (according to our definition).
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Now, it is likely that agents believe delusional hypotheses partly because of their
inability to believe otherwise, given the fact that (1) they are unable to think about
alternative hypotheses; (2) they are unable to examine alternative hypotheses
carefully due to reasoning biases; and (3) there are motivational factors favouring
their delusional hypotheses. Although the whole process of delusion formation and
maintenance is not fully understood, it would be fair to expect that such
impairments and biases play some role in the process. Thus, the first premise of
the argument seems to be true. Moreover, agents do not seem to be responsible for
the fact that they are not able to believe otherwise. After all, they are not responsible
for having those impairments and biases in most cases.
4 Conclusions
Delusions have obvious epistemic shortcomings, and are often defined on the basis
of their negative epistemic features, but a careful consideration of their epistemic
status reveals that in some circumstances they prevent serious epistemic harm from
occurring and that the agents adopting delusional beliefs do not fail to fulfil their
doxastic duties.
In Sect. 1, we saw that delusions enable agents to manage negative feelings that
could become overwhelming and provide an explanation for anomalous hyper-
salient experience, putting an end to a state of anxious expectation that undermines
attention and concentration. Some delusions also help agents resume learning that
was previously disrupted by erroneous prediction-error signalling. In the contexts
we considered, delusions support the agents’ epistemic functionality. In Sect. 2, we
asked whether agents are blameworthy for their delusional beliefs. We proposed that
agents are not blameworthy because, in the contexts in which delusions are formed,
their ability to believe otherwise is significantly compromised due to reasoning
impairments, biases, and motivational factors.
What does this tell us about the epistemic evaluation of delusional beliefs? Our
discussion does not suggest that delusional beliefs are epistemically good or
epistemically justified, but that they have some epistemic benefits that should be
acknowledged. In the legal context, an ‘‘innocence defence’’ applies when an act
that seems to be an offense is not regarded as wrongful. Here is an example:
Ann swings her arm and injures Ben. She faces moral condemnation and legal
liability unless she can offer an explanation that absolves her of full blame.
[…] If Ann acknowledges that she intentionally hit Ben but did so to prevent
Footnote 19 continued
This is an empirical question. It is certainly conceivable that some people with racist beliefs are not able
to believe otherwise. But, still, it does not necessarily mean that such people are not blameworthy. The
point of the case described in Defence Minister 4 is that one can be blameworthy even if one is not able to
believe otherwise when one is responsible for one’s inability. If it turns out that some people with racist
beliefs are responsible for their inability to believe otherwise, then we might say that they are blame-
worthy. And, perhaps it is not absurd to say (depending on the details though) that some people with racist
beliefs are actually responsible for letting their biases, desires or inclinations dominate their belief
formation and maintenance.
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him from detonating a bomb, she offers a justification. If she says that she
decided to hit him because she was insane, she offers an excuse. (Greenawalt
1986, p. 89)
The first form of defence (called justification defence) applies to an act that is not
regarded as an offence because it prevents serious harm from occurring. Self-
defence is perhaps the most common example of a justification defence. The second
sense of innocence (called excuse defence) applies to an act that is not regarded as
an offence because the person performing the act did not know that it was an
offence. Lack of capacity is a common example of an excuse defence.
When an innocence defence is advocated, the implication is that the person who
performed the act should be acquitted. Can we invoke something like an innocence
defence when considering the ethics of adopting a delusional belief? From a
consequentialist standpoint, the adoption of a delusional hypothesis may help avoid
bad epistemic consequences and it can support the agent’s epistemic functionality at
a critical time (as we argued in Sect. 1). From a deontological point of view,
impairments, biases, and motivational factors prevent agents from adopting an
alternative belief to the delusional one, and from recognising the epistemic
shortcomings of their delusions (as we argued in Sect. 2).
We propose that we have a case of epistemic innocence if, at the time of the agent
adopting the delusional beliefs, the delusion prevents a serious epistemic harm from
occurring, and no alternative beliefs are available to the agent. The notion of
epistemic innocence that we have applied to the adoption of delusional beliefs can
make a number of contributions to the general debate on the ethics of belief: it
points to the fact that the scope of epistemic evaluation is wider than the enterprise
of establishing whether a belief is justified; it forges connections between
deontological and consequentialist frameworks; and it emphasises the need to take
into account contextual factors in the practice of belief evaluation.
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